We argue here that, far more than serving as a liquidity backstop for periods of dysfunction in the foreign-exchange market, reserves have the primary function of signaling that the country is able to generate foreign currency to honor its external commitments.
The reversal of the downward trend in unemployment, the rise in inflation expected for next year (constraining any credible monetary-policy easing), low confidence in the private sector and further tightening of credit-granting standards suggest that a relevant part of the adjustment will come through a combination of higher default and contracting consumption.
The slowdown in domestic demand is already under way and tends to deepen in 2027. Cyclical sectors, credit, interest rates, the fiscal adjustment and the labor market all point to much weaker domestic demand next year.
The combination of high public debt and high interest rates, prevalent across major economies, tends to raise the probability of financial instability. The risk lies not only in public indebtedness itself, but in who finances those securities, with how much leverage and under what collateral conditions. That is what the IMF pointed to in its latest Financial Stability Report.
Brazil's national employment and income statistics conceal enormous regional inequality: states and capitals live with very different realities of employment, income, and informality — which reinforces the importance of programs such as Bolsa Família precisely where poverty is greatest.
The slowdown in domestic consumption shows that monetary policy has worked, with the real interest rate still elevated. Pezco projects the Selic at 13.25% by end-2026 — but two risks, fiscal and supply-side, require monitoring.
The output gap has closed and turned marginally negative, earlier than the Central Bank of Brazil expected. The dynamics point to weaker demand — rather than faster productivity — and support a gradual continuation of the easing cycle.
By the same criterion applied to demand, only three of the twelve supply sectors decelerate unambiguously — all tied to household consumption — and the weakening has already reached employment. Recent disinflation opens room to continue the Selic calibration.
GDP grew 0.48% in Q2 2026, but the private engine — household consumption and investment — has lost steam. With employment decelerating and household debt at record levels, the demand slowdown is likely to continue.
For the third consecutive election, Brazil is once again debating two competing visions for the country that, at their core, have been familiar since 2018. On one side, the Workers’ Party (PT) continues to see the state as a key driver of economic development. On the other, the Bolsonaro camp advocates a smaller state and a greater role for the private sector. The slogans and circumstances change, but the core of the debate remains largely the same.